INA §237(a)(2)(A)(vi): Full and Unconditional Pardon

INA §237(a)(2)(A)(vi) states that clauses (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) do not apply to a criminal conviction after a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or the Governor of a state.

The statutory wording matters twice: it identifies both the officials whose pardons qualify and the removal grounds affected. A defense should map the pardon to the exact charge rather than treat a pardon as a universal immigration cure.

The text covers the single CIMT ground, multiple CIMT ground, aggravated felony ground, and high speed flight ground. If one of those charges rests on a pardoned conviction, clause (vi) can be outcome determinative.

Counsel should prepare a charge chart showing which NTA counts fall inside those four clauses and which counts arise elsewhere in §237. That chart prevents an effective pardon argument from being overstated.

Congress inserted the federal sex offender registration ground as clause (v) and redesignated the pardon provision as clause (vi). The pardon text continues to identify clauses (i) through (iv), not clause (v).

The omission is important because Matter of Suh rejects implied expansion of the statutory pardon rule. If DHS charges §237(a)(2)(A)(v), the defense needs a separate legal theory.

The statute names the President and the Governor of any state. A court order, prosecutor's dismissal, parole board certificate, clemency recommendation, record seal, expungement, or local executive action should not automatically be treated as the specified pardon.

Obtain the original instrument and the law establishing the issuing official's authority. If the pardon was issued through a state clemency process, the record should make clear that it is legally the Governor's pardon.

The statutory protection applies to a full and unconditional pardon. Conditions, partial relief, commutation of sentence, restoration of selected civil rights, or relief limited to a collateral consequence can raise different questions.

The exact language of the pardon should be quoted in the immigration brief. Avoid relying on a certificate title alone when the operative text describes narrower relief.

A state may describe several forms of criminal relief as pardons, clemency, expungement, set aside, or restoration. Federal immigration law decides whether the relief satisfies §237(a)(2)(A)(vi).

The defense should include the state constitutional or statutory authority for the pardon, but the final legal argument must return to the INA's requirements.

A certified pardon, official executive record, or other reliable government authentication should be submitted. If an online clemency database confirms the pardon, it can supplement but should not replace the signed instrument when the latter is available.

The exhibit should identify the conviction pardoned, the date, the issuing authority, and the absence of conditions. Ambiguity about which conviction was pardoned can undermine an otherwise strong statutory defense.

One respondent may face an aggravated felony charge, a firearms charge, and a domestic violence charge based on the same or different convictions. The pardon provision does not operate at the level of a person's general criminal history.

Analyze each charge separately. A pardon can defeat one count while leaving another count untouched, making alternative relief or a second defense necessary.

Matter of Suh, 23 I&N Dec. 626 (BIA 2003), held that a presidential or gubernatorial pardon waives only the grounds specifically identified by the statute. The Board refused to extend the pardon to domestic violence or child abuse removability.

Suh is the central warning against broad language such as 'the conviction was pardoned, so it no longer matters for immigration.' The consequence depends on the particular statutory ground.

A sustained a criminal charge affected by a pardon charge does not answer every relief question. Counsel should separately review cancellation, adjustment, waivers, asylum related protection, withholding, Convention Against Torture protection, VAWA remedies, post conviction options, and any other relief supported by the respondent's status and history. Even when clause (vi) defeats a listed deportability ground, the pardoned conduct may remain relevant to discretionary relief unless governing law provides otherwise.

Counsel should distinguish the legal effect on removability from the evidentiary role the conduct may play in discretion, detention, or other statutory provisions.

The statutory text speaks of an alien who, subsequent to the criminal conviction, has been granted the qualifying pardon. The timeline should therefore show the conviction date and the later executive action clearly.

A pretrial clemency decision or prosecutorial dismissal raises different questions and should not be labeled a statutory pardon without authority.

Executive clemency instruments sometimes identify several cases, specific counts, or only part of a sentence. The immigration filing should demonstrate that the conviction supporting the charged ground is actually covered.

If more than one conviction forms the basis of multiple CIMT or aggravated felony charges, each predicate should be checked against the pardon instrument separately.

State systems use overlapping terminology, but federal immigration law asks whether there was a full and unconditional pardon by the President or Governor. A commutation that shortens a sentence does not necessarily satisfy that test.

Likewise, restoration of voting rights, a certificate of rehabilitation, or sealing order should be analyzed under its own legal effect rather than described as equivalent to a pardon.

Matter of Suh is especially important when DHS pleads domestic violence, child abuse, firearms, controlled substance, or sex offender registration grounds. Those provisions are not automatically erased by the pardon clause.

The final motion to terminate should state exactly which charges fall and which, if any, remain for adjudication.

Even where clause (vi) removes a listed ground of deportability, adjudicators may consider the underlying conduct when deciding discretionary relief unless another rule limits that consideration.

The respondent should therefore prepare rehabilitation and context evidence rather than assume the pardon prevents any discussion of the criminal history.

In a Full and Unconditional Pardon case, DHS may accept that a pardon exists but argue that it was not full, not unconditional, not issued by the required executive, or does not reach the charged ground. That expected theory should be written down before the response is drafted so counsel can identify which facts are truly disputed and which are legally irrelevant.

The defense should then compare DHS's theory with the statutory language and the primary authorities cited on this page. A strong response does not merely tell a competing story; it shows why the government's proof does or does not satisfy each required legal proposition.

The core working file for Full and Unconditional Pardon should include certified pardon instrument, executive clemency record, state constitutional or statutory authority, criminal judgments, and the NTA charge sheet. Those records should be collected before the merits brief because missing criminal or administrative documents can change the legal theory.

Each exhibit should have a stated purpose. Documents that prove the charge, documents that defeat an element, documents supporting an exception or waiver, and documents relevant only to discretion should be separated so the Immigration Judge can follow the reasoning.

INA §237(a)(2)(A)(vi) expressly removes deportability under the single-CIMT, multiple-CIMT, aggravated-felony, and high-speed-flight clauses when the respondent receives a qualifying full and unconditional pardon after the conviction.

The statute should be read literally. A pardon is powerful, but it does not create a general erasure of every immigration consequence arising from the same conduct.

Matter of Suh holds that a presidential or gubernatorial pardon waives only the removal grounds Congress specifically listed. The BIA therefore refused to extend the pardon to a separate domestic-violence or child-abuse charge even though the same pardoned conviction supplied the underlying criminal conduct.

Controlled-substance, firearms, protection-order, and other unlisted grounds likewise require independent analysis.

The statutory language identifies a pardon by the President or the Governor of a State. Older BIA precedent also distinguishes automatic restoration of civil rights or nonexecutive relief from the full and unconditional pardon contemplated by the INA.

Obtain the actual pardon instrument, issuing authority, conditions, date, and the exact conviction covered.

The text applies where the pardon is granted subsequent to the criminal conviction. The immigration record should therefore establish the conviction date, the pardon date, and that the pardon reaches the judgment DHS charged.

A broad certificate or restoration document should not be assumed to cover a conviction not identified by the issuing authority.

Even when the statutory deportability charge is waived, the underlying conduct can remain relevant to discretionary relief, admissibility on a later application, naturalization, or a separate unwaived removal ground depending on the governing statute.

The correct question is not whether the conviction was pardoned in the abstract, but which immigration consequence Congress attached to that pardon.