Can a Green Card Holder Be Deported? Removal Cases for Lawful Permanent Residents

A lawful permanent resident is authorized to live permanently in the United States, but LPR status remains subject to the Immigration and Nationality Act. INA §237 identifies grounds on which an admitted noncitizen, including an LPR, can be charged as deportable.

The expiration of the physical I-551 card does not by itself terminate permanent residence. The physical card is evidence of status. Loss of status generally occurs through abandonment, rescission or termination under applicable law, or a final removal process rather than simply because the plastic card reaches its expiration date.

Likewise, being arrested does not itself cancel permanent residence. A criminal case can create removal consequences, but the immigration analysis depends on the exact offense, disposition, admission history, and statutory ground.

INA §237 applies principally to a person who is in and admitted to the United States. When DHS charges an LPR with deportability, DHS generally must establish the charged ground by clear and convincing evidence.

The grounds include inadmissibility at the time of entry or adjustment, status and marriage related grounds, specified criminal convictions, controlled substance and firearms provisions, domestic violence and protection order grounds, document fraud, false citizenship claims, security grounds, unlawful voting, and other statutory categories.

Each ground contains its own elements. The fact that an LPR has a conviction does not mean every criminal deportability provision applies. Likewise, a USCIS fraud finding does not automatically establish every fraud based deportability theory.

The complete statutory framework is organized in the INA §237 Grounds of Deportability guide.

INA §237(a)(2) contains several separate criminal deportability grounds. They include specified crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, controlled substance offenses, firearms offenses, and certain domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, and protection order grounds.

The exact conviction matters more than a broad offense description. Immigration analysis may require the statute, subsection, elements, date of offense, date of admission, potential sentence, actual sentence, and the record of conviction.

An aggravated felony finding can have particularly serious consequences because it can affect removability, detention, asylum eligibility, cancellation of removal, and other forms of relief.

A criminal record should therefore be reviewed before international travel, naturalization, or another filing that may cause the immigration history to receive new agency scrutiny.

INA §237(a)(1)(A) can apply when a person was inadmissible at the time of entry or adjustment of status. In an LPR case, this can lead to allegations that the permanent residence itself was obtained despite an existing ground of inadmissibility.

Examples can involve alleged fraud or misrepresentation, undisclosed criminal history, or another inadmissibility issue said to have existed at adjustment or immigrant visa admission.

The timing is critical. The charge focuses on whether the person was inadmissible at the relevant historical moment. DHS must establish the charge under the governing removal framework rather than simply point to a later adverse event.

Some fraud related cases may also implicate INA §237(a)(1)(H), which provides a waiver in specified circumstances. Eligibility depends on the statutory requirements and the actual charge.

INA §101(a)(13)(C) establishes an important default: an LPR returning from abroad generally is not regarded as seeking admission unless one of six statutory exceptions applies.

The exceptions include abandonment or relinquishment of LPR status, a continuous absence exceeding 180 days, specified illegal activity after departure, departure while removal proceedings are pending, commission of an offense identified in INA §212(a)(2), and an attempt to enter without inspection at a place or time not designated by immigration officers.

If an exception applies, the returning LPR can be treated as an applicant for admission and charged under INA §212 rather than simply as an admitted respondent under INA §237.

This shift matters because inadmissibility and deportability use different statutory provisions and can involve different burden rules.

On June 23, 2026, the Supreme Court decided Blanche v. Lau. The Court held that INA §101(a)(13)(C)(v) does not require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a returning LPR committed a crime involving moral turpitude before regarding that person as seeking admission.

The Court described two distinct statutory steps. The first asks whether the returning LPR may be treated as seeking admission because the person has committed an offense identified in INA §212(a)(2). The second asks whether the person, once treated as an applicant for admission, is actually inadmissible under an applicable §212(a) ground. For a CIMT charge, commission can trigger the first inquiry, while conviction or a qualifying admission is ordinarily required for the criminal inadmissibility ground itself.

Lau also discussed an important burden distinction. Existing BIA precedent places a clear and convincing burden on DHS at the removal hearing to establish that a returning LPR falls within an INA §101(a)(13)(C) exception. The Supreme Court expressly stated that it was not deciding whether that BIA allocation is correct. The Court decided only that the same clear and convincing standard does not govern the border officer's initial classification decision.

An LPR can lose the benefit of the returning-resident presumption if permanent residence has been abandoned or relinquished. Abandonment is not determined solely from whether the trip lasted a particular number of months.

Relevant circumstances can include the purpose of the departure, intended duration, ties maintained in the United States, employment, home and family connections, tax treatment, return patterns, and evidence concerning whether the United States remained the person's permanent home.

The separate 180 day provision in §101(a)(13)(C)(ii) is important but should not be confused with abandonment. A continuous absence over 180 days is itself one statutory reason a returning LPR may be treated as seeking admission, even though the broader abandonment analysis asks a different question.

Form I-407 is used to record abandonment of lawful permanent resident status. Signing it can have major immigration consequences and should not be treated as a routine travel form.

An LPR at a port of entry can face questions about abandonment, criminal history, or admissibility. The existence of those questions does not mean the person must automatically agree to relinquish LPR status.

The legal consequences of signing, refusing to sign, being paroled, being placed in removal proceedings, or pursuing a returning resident visa can differ. The appropriate course depends on the facts and procedural posture.

An N-400 application requires USCIS to review parts of the applicant's immigration and criminal history. In some cases, that review reveals a question about whether the applicant was lawfully admitted for permanent residence or later became removable.

A naturalization denial does not automatically equal a removal order. But if USCIS concludes that the applicant is removable, the case may create enforcement or NTA issues under current agency policy.

An LPR with an unresolved criminal, fraud, prior removal, or adjustment issue should therefore understand the underlying immigration consequence before treating naturalization as merely a citizenship paperwork process.

INA §240A(a) provides an important form of relief for some LPRs in removal proceedings. The statute requires at least five years as an LPR, at least seven years of continuous residence after admission in any status, and no aggravated felony conviction.

The seven years must be calculated under the statutory stop time provisions. EOIR's current guidance notes that the required residence must generally be accumulated before the stop time event described by law.

Cancellation is discretionary. Even when the three statutory threshold requirements are satisfied, the immigration judge evaluates whether the respondent merits relief.

Evidence can address residence, family, employment, rehabilitation, service, tax compliance, hardship, community involvement, and the nature and recency of negative conduct.

LPR cancellation is not the only possible solution. Depending on the charge and history, an LPR may have a direct defense to removability, a statutory waiver, protection claim, former INA §212(c) issue in qualifying older cases, or another remedy.

INA §237 itself includes certain waivers, including §237(a)(1)(H) in qualifying fraud cases and provisions associated with some smuggling or domestic violence grounds.

The availability of a remedy should be analyzed separately from whether DHS can prove the underlying charge. More information is available in the Removal Defense guide and Relief From Removal guide.

An LPR case can turn on records created many years earlier. A useful review may include:

• the current and prior green cards;
• all passports and international travel history;
• the immigrant visa or adjustment file through which residence was obtained;
• prior I-130, I-140, I-485, I-751, or other relevant filings;
• the NTA and all later charging documents;
• certified criminal court records;
• CBP records from significant international entries;
• prior removal or immigration court records;
• records relevant to cancellation, a waiver, or another form of relief.

The resulting analysis should determine whether the respondent is being treated as admitted or seeking admission, the exact statutory charge, DHS's burden, available defenses, and every realistically available form of relief.

A returning LPR case should be analyzed in sequence rather than as one undifferentiated burden question. First, determine whether an exception in INA §101(a)(13)(C) permits the LPR to be regarded as seeking admission. After Blanche v. Lau, a border officer does not need clear and convincing evidence of the qualifying offense to make that initial classification under §101(a)(13)(C)(v).

At the removal hearing, existing BIA precedent has assigned DHS the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a returning LPR is an applicant for admission. Lau noted that rule but expressly declined to decide whether it is correct. Counsel should therefore distinguish the Supreme Court's holding about the border from the separate hearing-stage rule applied by the agency.

If the respondent is treated as an applicant for admission, INA §240(c)(2)(A) then places the statutory burden on the applicant to establish clearly and beyond doubt that the applicant is entitled to admission and is not inadmissible. That does not eliminate categorical, statutory, evidentiary, or record-based defenses to the particular inadmissibility charge. In Lau, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the underlying New Jersey offense actually qualified as a CIMT.

An LPR whose original adjustment is questioned may encounter references to both rescission and removal. They are separate procedures and should not be treated as synonyms.

EOIR's current Policy Manual explains that rescission proceedings determine whether permanent resident status should be taken away because the person was not entitled to become an LPR. INA §246(a) contains a five year limitation on rescission of adjustment of status. The rescission process begins through a Notice of Intent to Rescind and has its own response and hearing framework.

Removal proceedings, by contrast, proceed through the NTA and the applicable inadmissibility or deportability charges. An allegation that the person was inadmissible when residence was obtained can arise under INA §237(a)(1)(A) in a removal case.

The existence of the five year rescission limit should not be converted into the broader statement that every immigration consequence based on the original adjustment disappears after five years. The exact procedure, statutory charge, and controlling case law must be identified before relying on a limitations argument.

International travel can expose an LPR to a legal posture that would not arise in exactly the same way while the person remains inside the United States. INA §101(a)(13)(C) is the reason: a returning LPR generally remains treated as admitted unless one of the statutory exceptions applies.

A person with an old conviction, pending criminal charge, extended absence, abandonment concern, prior removal issue, or alleged immigration fraud should therefore determine whether travel could trigger an applicant for admission analysis before departing.

A reentry permit can be valuable evidence concerning temporary travel and permits return during its validity subject to applicable law, but possession of a permit should not be treated as an absolute guarantee of admission or as automatically defeating every abandonment issue.

The same caution applies to the length of an absence. More than 180 continuous days is expressly listed in §101(a)(13)(C)(ii), while abandonment under §101(a)(13)(C)(i) is a separate issue. Treating either rule as a simple one year or six month automatic test can obscure the actual statutory analysis.

Before travel, the record should include the criminal disposition, prior immigration history, relevant court or agency orders, and evidence concerning continuing U.S. ties. That review can determine whether travel presents a materially different risk than remaining in the United States while the issue is addressed.

EOIR's current guidance states that permanent resident cancellation requires at least five years as an LPR, at least seven years of continuous residence after lawful admission in any status before the applicable stop time event, no aggravated felony conviction, and a favorable exercise of discretion.

The last requirement means that meeting the numerical residence rules is not enough. The immigration judge weighs the record as a whole under the governing precedent.

Evidence can include the length and quality of residence, U.S. citizen and LPR family relationships, hardship to family, employment, property, taxes, rehabilitation, education, community service, medical responsibilities, and other equities. Negative conduct, criminal history, immigration violations, and lack of rehabilitation can weigh against a grant.

Because the aggravated felony bar and stop time rule can eliminate eligibility before discretion is reached, the criminal and admission history should be analyzed before a case is built primarily around favorable equities.