INA §237(a)(2)(C): Firearm and Destructive Device Offenses

INA §237(a)(2)(C) lists numerous firearm activities and expressly includes attempt and conspiracy. The weapon, part, or accessory must be a firearm or destructive device as defined in 18 U.S.C. §921(a), and the conduct must violate law.

The breadth of the verbs does not eliminate categorical analysis. The statute of conviction must still correspond to the federal firearm ground under current Supreme Court, circuit, and BIA precedent.

The statutory text applies to a person convicted at any time after admission. There is no five year timing period and no universal sentence threshold.

Build the admission and conviction chronology anyway because it can affect other charges and forms of relief. A firearms case often exists alongside CIMT or aggravated felony allegations.

The INA cross references the firearm and destructive device definitions in 18 U.S.C. §921(a). A state statute can define weapons more broadly than the federal definition, creating a categorical issue.

Counsel should compare the state definition in effect at conviction with the relevant federal definition and controlling circuit precedent.

Matter of Chairez and related precedent apply categorical principles to firearms removability. The analysis asks whether the minimum conduct criminalized by the statute falls within the federal firearm ground and whether the statute is divisible when it covers alternative weapons.

If divisible, the limited record of conviction may identify the weapon alternative. The police report should not be used merely to repair an overbroad indivisible statute.

Federal firearm law excludes certain antique firearms from the firearm definition. Some state statutes do not contain the same exclusion. That textual difference has generated important categorical litigation.

The governing circuit's realistic probability approach must be researched before relying on antique firearm overbreadth. A defense should identify actual state law applications where required.

Matter of Flores-Abarca, 26 I&N Dec. 922 (BIA 2017), held that transporting a loaded firearm under the Oklahoma statute was categorically a firearms offense even though the INA does not expressly use the word transporting. The Board emphasized the broad scope of §237(a)(2)(C).

Flores-Abarca is important when arguing from a difference in verbs. It does not eliminate separate categorical questions about whether the object involved is federally a firearm or destructive device.

The statute expressly covers attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry qualifying weapons. Counsel should therefore identify the target firearm offense rather than assume an inchoate conviction falls outside the ground.

The weapon definition and categorical framework still matter to the attempt or conspiracy predicate.

For firearm deportability, the defense should obtain certified criminal court records rather than rely on a rap sheet or case summary. The charging document, plea or verdict, judgment, sentencing order, and later modification orders can answer different immigration questions. When divisibility is at issue, Shepard type conviction records may establish the particular weapon or subsection.

Keep offense classification separate from discretionary facts. The categorical analysis should not turn into a trial about allegations that were unnecessary to the conviction.

A conviction vacated for a substantive or procedural defect can have a different immigration effect from an order entered only for rehabilitation or immigration purposes. Sentence changes may matter to aggravated felony charges even where they do not change the firearms ground.

Coordinate the immigration and criminal strategies so that post conviction relief addresses the precise ground actually charged.

A sustained firearm deportability charge does not answer every relief question. Counsel should separately review cancellation, adjustment, waivers, asylum related protection, withholding, Convention Against Torture protection, VAWA remedies, post conviction options, and any other relief supported by the respondent's status and history. The same offense should be screened separately for aggravated felony and CIMT classifications, cancellation bars, and discretionary impact.

Do not assume that defeating an aggravated felony allegation automatically defeats §237(a)(2)(C), or vice versa.

A practical §237(a)(2)(C) analysis should proceed in a fixed order: confirm the immigration conviction, identify the statute and weapon element, compare state and federal firearm definitions, analyze overbreadth and divisibility under the governing circuit, review the record of conviction, and then address post conviction options and relief. Using the same sequence in the legal memorandum, exhibit list, and hearing preparation reduces the risk that a serious factual allegation will obscure a threshold statutory defect.

This keeps the broad statutory verbs from obscuring the separate federal definition and categorical questions.

Firearm statutes are frequently amended to add or remove weapon categories, sentencing rules, exceptions, or definitions. The categorical analysis should use the version that governed the conviction rather than the current state code by default.

The file should preserve the historical statute and any incorporated definitions. A later statutory amendment can make a current online code section look narrower or broader than the offense actually adjudicated.

Section 237(a)(2)(C) reaches certain weapons, parts, and accessories that fall within the incorporated federal firearm or destructive device definitions. A state statute can use broader terminology for weapon components.

Counsel should compare the state object element with 18 U.S.C. §921(a), especially where the conviction involved ammunition, frames, receivers, accessories, or unusual weapon components.

The BIA treated transporting a loaded firearm as within the broadly worded firearms ground even though transporting is not one of the verbs quoted in the INA. The decision cautions against overly literal verb matching.

A stronger defense generally focuses on the weapon definition, categorical breadth, divisibility, or conviction record rather than the absence of one everyday verb.

A state statute that includes antique firearms can be textually broader than the federal definition, but federal circuits differ in how they apply the realistic probability requirement.

The brief should cite controlling circuit precedent and, where required, examples of actual state prosecutions involving antique firearms.

The INA text refers to a weapon, part, or accessory that is a firearm or destructive device as defined federally. Some state statutes separately criminalize ammunition possession.

Counsel should identify the precise object element and avoid assuming that every ammunition offense necessarily falls within the firearm deportability ground.

In Matter of Ortega-Quezada, 28 I&N Dec. 598 (BIA 2022), the Board held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §922(d) for unlawfully selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm or ammunition did not establish removability under INA §237(a)(2)(C). The federal criminal statute was broader than the immigration firearms ground because it covered ammunition, and the Board found the statute indivisible in the relevant respect.

The decision is a useful reminder that even a federal firearms statute is not automatically a categorical match. Where the statute of conviction reaches both firearms and ammunition, the divisibility analysis determines whether the record of conviction may be consulted or whether the broader statute defeats the charge.

A firearms offense may also be charged as an aggravated felony under a different §101(a)(43) category, but the two grounds use different statutory tests.

Sentence length, federal analogues, and offense elements should be mapped separately so one classification is not used as shorthand for the other.

Section 237(a)(2)(C) lists broad conduct involving firearms and destructive devices, so DHS will usually identify the conviction and argue that the statutory verb and object both fall within the federal ground. Matter of Flores-Abarca gives the conduct language a broad reading, but the federal definitions in 18 U.S.C. §921 still matter to the object of the offense.

The response should therefore separate two questions: what conduct the state statute criminalizes and what objects it reaches. Matter of Ortega-Quezada illustrates why a statute extending to ammunition can be overbroad even when the underlying case is commonly described as a firearm offense.

Obtain the statute of conviction and all incorporated weapon definitions in effect at the time of conviction, together with the charging document, plea or verdict, judgment, and any permissible record needed for a divisible statute. State cases interpreting antique weapons, ammunition, parts, constructive possession, or transportation can reveal breadth that is not obvious from the statutory caption.

Federal §921 definitions should be placed beside the state definitions in the working file. If the statute reaches an object outside the federal definition, the analysis must then address divisibility and any circuit specific realistic probability requirement before relying on the mismatch.

A conviction can trigger §237(a)(2)(C) without being an aggravated felony, and an aggravated felony firearm theory may depend on a separate federal analogue. Domestic violence, moral turpitude, sentence consequences, and eligibility for discretionary relief likewise require their own statutory tests.

The case chart should therefore identify the firearm ground independently from every parallel charge or relief bar. This prevents a broad finding under §237(a)(2)(C) from being treated as proof of a different criminal immigration category.

Calling an object a firearm under state law does not establish that it falls within 18 U.S.C. §921. Antique firearm exceptions, ammunition provisions, and statutes covering components can create a mismatch. Matter of Ortega-Quezada is a concrete example of why the object definition cannot be skipped.

Another error is to focus only on possession. Section 237(a)(2)(C) expressly reaches many verbs, and Matter of Flores-Abarca interprets the provision broadly. A defense should identify the actual source of overbreadth instead of assuming the conduct verb itself is narrow.

A disciplined firearm analysis asks four questions in order. What conduct does the statute prohibit? What weapons or objects does it cover? Are any broader alternatives separate elements? If the statute is divisible, what does the permitted conviction record establish? That structure makes it easier to identify whether the dispute concerns transportation or use, ammunition, antique firearms, or another statutory alternative.

Only after the §237(a)(2)(C) comparison should counsel address any aggravated felony analogue, post conviction relief, or discretionary application. Those issues may matter greatly, but they should not substitute for the threshold categorical analysis.

The Immigration Judge should identify the precise conviction statute, the conduct covered by the relevant alternative, and the federal firearm or destructive device definition being used for comparison. If the state law is broader, the decision should address divisibility and the permissible conviction record before finding a categorical match.

Ammunition and antique firearm issues should be resolved explicitly when raised. Any aggravated felony charge should receive a separate analysis because the statutory pathways and federal comparators are not identical.

The final review should verify the historical state statute, incorporated definitions, and controlling state decisions on the date of conviction. It should also confirm the federal §921 language used as the comparator and whether circuit precedent imposes a realistic probability requirement for the asserted mismatch.

The criminal record should be pared down to documents legally relevant to divisibility and the conviction alternative. Police descriptions of the weapon may be factually accurate but cannot automatically cure a categorical mismatch in the statute of conviction.