INA §237(a)(2)(E)(ii): Violation of a Protection Order

Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) focuses on a person who is enjoined under a qualifying protection order and whom a court determines engaged in conduct violating the protective portion of that order.

That wording makes this ground materially different from the domestic violence conviction ground. The first task is to identify the order, the court determination, and the specific provision violated.

The statute defines a protection order as an injunction issued to prevent violent or threatening acts of domestic violence, including temporary or final civil or criminal orders, while excluding support and child custody orders or provisions.

A family court document containing many different directives should be parsed provision by provision. Not every term in the order is a qualifying protective provision.

The court determination must concern the portion of the order involving protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the protected person or persons.

A technical violation of an unrelated support, property, scheduling, or custody term should not be assumed to satisfy the statutory language.

The statute requires that the court determine the respondent engaged in the prohibited violation. Matter of Obshatko directs immigration judges to examine probative and reliable evidence of what the state court determined.

The immigration court should not invent a protected violation from raw allegations when the state court's actual determination involved a different part of the order.

Because the ground is keyed to a court determination, civil contempt or another noncriminal determination can potentially support removability. Matter of Medina-Jimenez illustrates the significance of a contempt based protection order record.

The lack of an INA §101(a)(48)(A) conviction therefore does not automatically defeat the charge.

Matter of Obshatko, 27 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2017), held that the categorical approach does not govern §237(a)(2)(E)(ii), even when a conviction underlies the charge. The immigration judge instead considers probative and reliable evidence about what the state court determined.

This makes the actual protection order, contempt findings, judgment, hearing transcript, and incorporated charging papers especially important.

Matter of Medina-Jimenez, 27 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 2018), applied Obshatko to a contempt determination for violating a stay away provision issued under Oregon domestic violence law and found the offense fell within the protection order ground.

The decision shows that later relabeling a judgment from conviction to contempt does not necessarily defeat this nonconviction based removal ground.

Obtain the original order, proof of service, alleged violation filing, transcript, findings, contempt judgment or criminal judgment, and any amended order. The text of the violated provision often determines whether the charge fits.

A police report may help explain context but should not replace the court's actual determination required by the statute.

The domestic violence victim waiver expressly includes §237(a)(2)(E)(ii). A battered respondent who was not the primary perpetrator may qualify when the violation involved an order intended to protect the respondent or another statutory circumstance.

The waiver should be screened at the beginning of the case because the same protection order record may show that the respondent was also a protected victim.

Potential defenses include a nonqualifying order, violation of an unprotected provision, lack of a qualifying court determination, unreliable proof about what the court decided, mistaken identity, or statutory waiver eligibility.

The defense should quote the order and court finding rather than rely on generalized testimony that the incident was minor.

A sustained protection order violation deportability charge does not answer every relief question. Counsel should separately review cancellation, adjustment, waivers, asylum related protection, withholding, Convention Against Torture protection, VAWA remedies, post conviction options, and any other relief supported by the respondent's status and history. The absence of a criminal conviction can matter to some other criminal bars even though it does not defeat §237(a)(2)(E)(ii).

Counsel should analyze the §237(a)(7) waiver and broader relief in parallel.

State law can require service, notice, presence, or another basis before a court may enforce a protection order. Although the INA focuses on the court's determination of violation, defects in the underlying order or notice can affect what the state court validly decided.

Obtain proof of service and the order in effect on the date of the alleged violation.

The INA definition expressly excludes support and child custody orders or provisions. A single family court order may contain stay-away terms, communication limits, support obligations, and custody schedules.

The immigration charge should identify the specific violated provision and explain why that provision protected against threats, harassment, or bodily injury.

A police report or contempt petition may accuse the respondent of several violations, while the court ultimately finds only one. Obshatko directs attention to what the court determined.

The defense should compare the allegation, hearing transcript, and final order so DHS does not rely on conduct the state court never found.

Because §237(a)(2)(E)(ii) is not conviction based, changing the state label from criminal conviction to civil or contempt terminology may not resolve removability. Medina-Jimenez illustrates this point.

Post judgment litigation should therefore address the underlying court determination, not merely the word conviction.

A respondent can violate an order that was originally intended to protect the respondent from abuse. Section 237(a)(7) expressly recognizes that situation as a possible waiver route.

The full protection order history, including cross-orders and prior abuse findings, should be preserved.

A protection order charge is unusual because DHS need not begin with a criminal conviction. Under Matter of Obshatko, the focus is what a court determined about the violation and whether the violated portion of the order protected against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury. The government therefore may rely on the order, violation proceedings, findings, and other probative evidence rather than only a judgment of conviction.

The response should identify the exact paragraph or condition allegedly violated and the adjudicative finding that establishes the violation. Terms dealing only with property, custody, support, or other nonprotective matters should not be treated as though every provision of a family court order falls within §237(a)(2)(E)(ii).

The file should contain the complete protection order, every incorporated attachment, proof of service or notice, the petition or charging document alleging the violation, hearing transcript or minutes, written findings, contempt order or criminal judgment, and later amendments. Those documents reveal both what the respondent was legally required to do and what the court actually decided.

Where the order contains many provisions, mark the precise protective clause at issue. A chronology of issuance, service, alleged conduct, hearing, and adjudication can expose gaps that are difficult to see when the documents are reviewed separately.

The same episode may also support a domestic violence conviction, stalking charge, child abuse allegation, or discretionary concern. Those theories cannot simply be folded into §237(a)(2)(E)(ii). The protection order ground depends on a qualifying order, a covered protective portion, and a court determination that the respondent engaged in conduct violating that portion.

If §237(a)(7) may apply because the respondent was a victim of domestic violence, that waiver analysis should begin early. The evidence supporting victimization can be extensive and may come from sources different from the evidence used to contest the underlying protection order charge.

After Matter of Obshatko, a categorical comparison of a criminal statute does not control this ground. The immigration court may consider reliable evidence of what the state court determined. The opposite shortcut is equally problematic: the existence of a protection order does not make any breach of any term deportable.

The statutory question is narrower. The violated portion must involve protection against the harms identified in §237(a)(2)(E)(ii), and the evidence must establish the relevant court determination. Technical violations of unrelated provisions require separate analysis.

Begin by mapping the order paragraph by paragraph. Identify which clauses concern threats, harassment, or bodily injury and which concern unrelated family or property matters. Then match the government's evidence to the state court's actual finding rather than to the allegations that started the violation proceeding.

Challenges to service, ambiguity, withdrawn allegations, or an adjudication limited to a noncovered term should be developed from the original state court record. If a §237(a)(7) waiver is plausible, prepare it on a parallel track without conceding that DHS established the charge.

The Immigration Judge should identify the qualifying protection order, the particular provision said to have been violated, the protective purpose of that provision, and the evidence showing what the issuing or enforcing court determined. A criminal conviction may be relevant, but it is not a universal prerequisite.

The ruling should also separate a §237(a)(2)(E)(ii) finding from any domestic violence or stalking conviction theory. If the respondent seeks §237(a)(7), waiver eligibility and discretion follow only after the elements of the charged ground are analyzed.

Before hearing, compare the initial accusation with the final state court disposition. Confirm service, identify the enforceable version of the order, and determine whether the court made a finding concerning the same protective provision DHS relies upon. Dismissed allegations and background narratives should not be mistaken for adjudicated violations.

The hearing file should make the sequence visually clear. A short chart linking order paragraph, alleged conduct, evidence, and final finding can be more useful than a large undifferentiated set of family court records.