INA §237(a)(3)(B): Failure to Register and Falsification of Documents

INA §237(a)(3)(B) is textually different from both the change-of-address ground in §237(a)(3)(A) and the civil document-fraud ground in §237(a)(3)(C). Subparagraph (B) expressly requires a conviction and then identifies three federal categories. That structure makes the criminal judgment, statute of conviction, and final disposition central to removability.

DHS should not be permitted to convert a general accusation of false paperwork into this ground. The charge must fit clause (i), (ii), or (iii). If the conviction was entered under some other statute, DHS may have another theory, but §237(a)(3)(B) itself should be tested against its specific statutory cross-references.

The statute also says at any time. Unlike many crime grounds under INA §237(a)(2), §237(a)(3)(B) does not condition the listed conviction on its having occurred after admission. The date of conviction still matters for other immigration consequences, but the text of this particular ground should not be rewritten to add an after-admission requirement Congress did not include.

Clause (i) reaches a conviction under 8 U.S.C. §1306(c), as well as the historical predecessor identified in the INA. Section 1306(c) addresses knowingly false statements in an application for alien registration and procuring or attempting to procure registration through fraud.

The immigration inquiry should begin with the actual criminal count. A conviction for some different registration offense is not automatically a conviction under §1306(c). The government should identify the federal statute, the count of conviction, and the judgment showing that the respondent was convicted of the offense Congress incorporated into §237(a)(3)(B)(i).

Clause (ii) covers a conviction for violating, attempting to violate, or conspiring to violate any provision of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. FARA is a disclosure statute administered by the Department of Justice and applies to specified agents of foreign principals who engage in covered activities in the United States, subject to statutory exemptions and definitions.

A removal case is not the place to assume that any foreign connection equals a FARA violation. Section 237(a)(3)(B)(ii) is conviction based. Counsel should obtain the indictment or information, plea agreement, judgment, and the particular FARA provision involved. The statutory exemptions or scope questions may have been litigated in the criminal case, but the immigration court still must identify the conviction that triggers the removal ground.

Clause (iii) reaches a conviction for violating, attempting to violate, or conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. §1546. Section 1546 is broader than a single counterfeit-visa offense. It addresses several forms of fraud and misuse involving visas, permits, border crossing cards, registration documents, evidence of authorized stay or employment, and certain false attestations and document conduct.

Because Congress cross-referenced the federal statute itself, the judgment should establish a §1546 conviction. A state forgery conviction, a fraud finding in an immigration application, or a civil §274C document-fraud order is legally different. Those facts may create other immigration consequences, but they do not substitute for the specific federal conviction required by clause (iii).

The INA's definition of conviction in §101(a)(48)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(48)(A), should be checked whenever the disposition is unusual. A formal judgment of guilt ordinarily qualifies. Certain withheld-adjudication dispositions can also qualify if the statutory requirements are met.

Vacatur, post-conviction relief, amended judgments, and deferred dispositions should be analyzed from the actual court record rather than labels. The critical question is what legally operative disposition exists for immigration purposes and whether that disposition is for one of the statutes §237(a)(3)(B) names.

The most useful documents are the indictment or information, plea agreement, plea colloquy if available, judgment, sentencing order, docket, and any later order changing the conviction. These materials establish the statute and count on which the removal charge depends.

Police narratives may help counsel understand the history, but this ground is triggered by conviction. The legal analysis should stay anchored to the conviction and the statute Congress selected instead of drifting into an open-ended inquiry about suspected fraud.

Section 237(a)(3)(C) is separately triggered by a final civil order for violating INA §274C. Section 237(a)(3)(B), by contrast, requires one of the listed criminal convictions. A person can therefore have immigration-document allegations without satisfying both grounds.

This distinction matters when reviewing the NTA. DHS should identify whether it is relying on a criminal judgment under §1546 or another §237(a)(3)(B) predicate, a final OCAHO or other §274C order under §237(a)(3)(C), or a different fraud ground entirely. Each theory has its own elements and record.

FARA defines terms such as foreign principal and agent of a foreign principal and contains registration duties, disclosure obligations, exemptions, and enforcement provisions. The current DOJ FARA Unit administers that regime. The immigration ground does not independently decide whether someone should have registered; it asks whether there is a qualifying FARA conviction, attempt conviction, or conspiracy conviction.

That is especially important because public reporting about foreign influence can use terminology more broadly than the statute. Removal counsel should rely on the criminal case and the statutory provision of conviction, not headlines or generalized descriptions of a person's foreign contacts.

Section 1546 includes conduct involving forged or unlawfully obtained immigration documents, misuse of genuine documents, false statements connected to immigration documents, and specified false attestations. The paragraph of conviction may therefore matter to related immigration issues even when §237(a)(3)(B)(iii) is satisfied by the §1546 conviction itself.

The same conviction may also be alleged to have consequences under other parts of the INA, such as fraud, crimes involving moral turpitude, or aggravated-felony provisions depending on the precise offense and record. Those additional theories should be analyzed separately rather than assumed from the §237(a)(3)(B) charge.

In removal proceedings, DHS bears the burden of establishing deportability by clear and convincing evidence. For this ground, that means proving identity, alienage and admission as required by the case, the qualifying conviction, and the statutory fit within §237(a)(3)(B).

If the judgment is ambiguous about the statute, if the conviction was vacated on a legally recognized basis, or if DHS relies on conduct rather than the actual conviction, those defects should be addressed before moving to discretionary relief.

For §1306(c), ask whether the judgment is actually for fraudulent registration under that subsection. For FARA, identify the exact provision and whether the conviction is for a completed violation, attempt, or conspiracy. For §1546, confirm that the federal judgment is under that statute and determine the paragraph and count.

Then review the validity and immigration effect of the conviction itself. A case can turn on a narrow document problem: the wrong statute, an amended count, a vacated judgment, or an NTA allegation that overstates what the criminal record proves.

Even when the predicate conviction is established, the respondent's eligibility for cancellation, adjustment or a waiver, asylum-related protection, withholding, Convention Against Torture protection, or other relief depends on the rest of the immigration and criminal history. The existence of this ground does not by itself answer every relief question.

Counsel should also check whether the same conviction triggers an independent bar to a particular form of relief. That analysis should be based on the exact offense, sentence, dates, and record rather than the label 'document fraud.'

A full and unconditional pardon should not be assumed to eliminate this charge. The INA's express pardon provision in §237(a)(2)(A)(vi) applies to the specified crime grounds in §237(a)(2)(A)(i) through (iv); it does not by its terms waive deportability under §237(a)(3)(B). Post-conviction relief must therefore be analyzed under the rules governing the continuing immigration validity of the conviction itself.

The working file should include the NTA, complete certified criminal record, immigration history, any post-conviction orders, and the federal statute in effect at the time of the offense. For a FARA conviction, the charging provision and judgment are especially important. For §1546, the paragraph and factual basis may matter to other immigration consequences.

The goal is to answer a narrow question first: does the operative conviction fall within one of the three categories Congress listed in §237(a)(3)(B)? Only after that issue is resolved should the case move to overlapping charges or relief strategy.

INA §237(a)(3)(B) is a conviction-based cross-reference statute. It does not make every registration problem, foreign-agent allegation, or false document deportable under this paragraph. DHS must prove a conviction under §1306(c), a qualifying FARA provision, or §1546, including an attempt or conspiracy where the statute expressly includes it.

The most effective review starts with the judgment and charging documents, then separates this ground from civil §274C document fraud and from broader fraud or criminal grounds elsewhere in the INA.