Terminating Removal Proceedings to Pursue USCIS Relief: Matter of Coronado Acevedo

Coronado Acevedo overruled the categorical restriction imposed by Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B- and recognized that termination or dismissal may be appropriate in limited circumstances, including when ending proceedings is necessary for a respondent to seek relief before USCIS. The decision does not create a general right to terminate whenever a USCIS benefit exists. The motion should identify the specific jurisdictional or eligibility barrier created by active proceedings and explain why ending the case removes that barrier.

Coronado Acevedo overruled Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B- and recognized that adjudicators may consider termination or dismissal in appropriate limited settings. The opinion specifically identified circumstances involving USCIS adjustment jurisdiction, travel for visa processing, and respondents who obtained lawful permanent residence after proceedings began.

A motion should identify the exact USCIS benefit, the jurisdictional obstacle created by pending proceedings, the respondent’s prima facie eligibility, and why termination—not simply continuance or closure—is needed. The requested order should also address whether dismissal is with or without prejudice and what happens if USCIS later denies the benefit.

Include the relevant petition or application, USCIS receipts or approvals, jurisdictional regulation, immigration history, visa availability, admissibility analysis, and any ICE agreement. If the request depends on travel for consular processing, document the visa case and the consequences of leaving while proceedings remain pending.

Coronado Acevedo does not require termination whenever a respondent prefers USCIS adjudication. Later precedent demonstrates that speculation about future eligibility is not enough. The record should show a concrete and legally available path, not a chain of hoped-for discretionary events.

The central issue is often forum. Certain benefits are exclusively or primarily within USCIS authority, while others can be adjudicated by the Immigration Judge. The motion must identify why EOIR should end its case rather than adjudicate available relief itself.

DHS may dispute prima facie eligibility, argue that the benefit can be pursued without termination, or oppose ending proceedings because removability should be resolved first. A detailed jurisdictional explanation is more useful than a general plea for prosecutorial discretion.

Compare termination with continuance and administrative closure before filing. If the USCIS benefit cannot be adjudicated until proceedings end, say so and cite the governing regulation or policy. If termination is merely convenient, the motion is materially weaker.

The decision should explain the legal basis for termination, the collateral benefit, the jurisdictional consequence of continued proceedings, the respondent’s apparent eligibility, and DHS’s position. An order that ends proceedings without identifying the procedural rationale can create later confusion.

On appeal, focus on whether the Immigration Judge understood the legal availability of the USCIS benefit and the effect of pending proceedings. Coronado Acevedo is strongest where termination is necessary to make otherwise available relief adjudicable.

A request is more persuasive when USCIS cannot adjudicate the desired benefit while EOIR proceedings remain pending, or when termination is required to avoid an identified adverse immigration consequence. If USCIS already has jurisdiction and can adjudicate the application without EOIR action, explain what additional legal purpose termination serves. The distinction between necessity and convenience helps the Immigration Judge determine whether a lesser tool, such as a continuance or administrative closure, would address the same problem without ending the case.

The termination motion should include enough evidence to show that the USCIS route is real and legally available. That may require an approved petition, proof of a qualifying classification, jurisdictional facts, admissibility analysis, visa availability, or another threshold predicate. The court is not being asked to grant the outside benefit, but it should not terminate based on a theory that depends on missing statutory elements. Matter of Roque-Izada later illustrates the risk of termination when future USCIS eligibility rests on speculation.

The proposed order should be connected to a concrete next step: reopening an administratively closed I-485 with USCIS, transferring an EOIR-filed adjustment application, filing a benefit that becomes available only after termination, or completing another defined agency process. Attach current agency guidance when it helps show the handoff. A clear sequence makes it easier for the Immigration Judge to see that termination will advance an existing legal process rather than simply remove the case from the court’s docket.

Termination shifts the immediate forum but does not guarantee USCIS approval. Counsel should consider what happens if USCIS later denies the benefit, including whether DHS may initiate new proceedings or whether a USCIS motion or appeal exists. The EOIR record should accurately state the eligibility theory and avoid overstating the effect of termination. That precision protects credibility and helps distinguish a proper Coronado Acevedo request from a motion based on hoped-for future discretion.

The best timing is usually when the collateral path is concrete enough to show prima facie eligibility and a defined next step. Filing before key predicates exist can make the request look speculative; waiting too long can create unnecessary litigation and enforcement risk.